The Human Propensity to Treat the Invisible as Unimportant

The danger of human myopia

More than 70% of the Earth's surface is covered by water. The oceans are vast and extremely deep in many places, making them an attractive place to dispose of things we would rather not think about.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration recently issued a warning that supermarket shrimp may contain cesium-137. This is not just an indication of the agency's vigilance but also serves as a reminder of the quickly forgotten news reports from previous decades about radioactive material being dumped into the world's oceans. The question of what impact nuclear leaks are likely to have on marine ecosystems is still pertinent and deserves our attention.

The inclination to merely "make dangerous things disappear so we don't have to think about them anymore" reveals a fatal collective human propensity. How is this irrationality possible, and what can be done to address it? This is the core question at issue here.

Nuclear waste disposal at depth

Between 1950 and the 1990s, it was normal practice to dump barrels of certain radioactive materials into the Atlantic Ocean. To our knowledge, this does not include waste from nuclear power plants. The disposal of radioactive material at sea was considered a practical solution, with little consideration given to the long-term risks.

The issue came to some public attention after low concentrations of radioactive material were released into the Pacific Ocean following the Fukushima disaster in 2011.

Marine researchers have had the issue on their screens for decades and have issued clear warnings.

A total of 56,000 barrels containing radioactive material, DDT, and forever chemicals have been confirmed along the U.S. Pacific coast. On the other side of the world, over 200,000 barrels lie on the Atlantic seabed at depths of 3 to 5 km. The waste was packaged in cement or bitumen containers that were deemed to resist the pressure and corrosion.

This summer, a research group led by the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) used cutting-edge technology to locate 3,355 containers in the Atlantic Ocean, map their locations, start analysing their condition and establish the extent to which the water, sediments, and fauna have been impacted.

Another issue of concern are accidents involving naval forces that can pose similar nuclear risks.

There are few details available regarding nuclear waste from the former USSR, which was disposed in the Kara Sea. In addition to around 17,000 containers of unknown content, 16 nuclear reactor cores from submarines were sunk, some of which still contain nuclear material. A complete nuclear submarine, the K-27, was also sunk after losing control.

London Convention

Several years before the Fukushima incident, the initial lack of concern on the part of most governments had already given way to more caution. From 1976 to 2006, a gradual process led to a prohibition of the storage of slightly radioactive material on the seabed. The International Maritime Organization now administers the 'London Convention' which bans the practice of dumping nuclear waste into the seas.

Not all countries have signed the convention and some locations of dumping grounds may be unknown or inaccessible to marine researchers, so the continuation of illegal dumping cannot be ruled out. Corroding barrels exposed to physical pressure and salt water continue to be a cause for concern. The convention has therefore been a means of containment, not a solution.

However, the mere existence of a rule naturally triggers the question of how one might gain an edge by breaking it. After the London Convention came into force, an “ecomafia” developed a business model based on dumping nuclear waste and illegally sinking entire ships carrying nuclear material off the coasts of Italy and Somalia.

The human propensity to trivialise

From the outset, it was clear that containers holding nuclear material which are exposed to the pressure of the ocean depths and salt water over long periods of time and are susceptible to corrosion pose a long-term risk. Disposing of them in large quantities in the oceans was bound to create a substantial risk. The decision-makers failed to act on existing knowledge.

The error occurred worldwide. It also occurred continuously. This means the reasons for it must have something to do with human nature.

Sociologist Niklas Luhmann observed that regardless of the objective, lengthy and complicated procedures within a hierarchy lead those involved to believe in the legitimacy of the outcome regardless of the personal ethical principles that they started with. This is known as 'Legitimation by Procedure’. Conclusions very similar to this were reached by other social scientists.

Luhman’s theories are difficult for anyone with experience working In the bureaucracies of the state or companies to disprove. We are all familiar with people, and even may see ourselves in those who:

• Feel confident in their decisions once they have convinced themselves that they have complied with the regulations and not broken any rules. Their thinking is less fact-based and more rule-based.
• Feel pressured to give in to demands from their superiors (feeling of weakness).
• Shift responsibility to those below them in the hierarchy, such as 'technical specialists', who usually have more factual knowledge, but are averse to conflict with their superiors.
• Prefer solutions that seem as far away as possible in terms of both space and time ('out of sight, out of mind'), and that are unlikely to cause a stir in the near future.
• Are prone to believing in the healing power of time.
• Believe that future generations, who are expected to be more technologically advanced, will easily find suitable solutions to long-term problems.
• Have little or no sense of responsibility for what will happen after they die. The thought of their descendants fades into the background.
• In a hierarchical decision-making system, they would find it difficult to champion solutions that cannot be implemented quickly, easily and cheaply. Exposing oneself to accusations of wasting taxpayers' money by proposing 'expensive' solutions is risky for future career development.

Clearly feelings and crude beliefs play a predominant role in the evaluation of facts when making decisions. Throughout history, mankind has always developed cultures of trivialisation at the leadership level that are unimpressed by facts and can spread like a strain of bacteria. Human nature is their breeding ground. There is no reason to believe this will ever dry up.

Nevertheless, while we likely cannot eliminate irrationality from leadership, we can mitigate its effects by designing rules and mechanisms.

Rules for long term mitigation

Before the disposal of nuclear material in the sea was prohibited, there were only procedural rules; now, however, the ban has also resulted in material standards. In these circumstances, we should observe a positive effect of Luhmann’s theorem of how procedure creates legitimacy. With strict and meticulous procedures to follow concerning the safe disposal of nuclear material, only once they have carefully checked and implemented all formal and qualitative criteria can decision-makers feel confident.

More transparent decision-making procedures

When ecosystems may be at risk, decision-making processes should be made more open so that there is room for alternative strategies to be developed and for targets to be changed during a planning process. Even unfounded controversies should not be viewed as disturbances, but rather as a means of reducing risk. Like in the technology sector, disruptions should be seen as opportunities for improvement.

Decision-makers should be required to examine different approaches in detail, and at the end of the process should be able to justify and document different courses of action transparently by presenting arguments for and against each proposal.

They should be held to prioritise long-term risk avoidance when making decisions.

The names of those at the top of the hierarchy who take decisions must be clearly documented and not diluted by 'endorsements' from a large number of contributors placed on 'cc'. Without a crystal-clear allocation of responsibility, regulations have no teeth.

More transparent decision-making also protects those at the top of the hierarchy from accusations of wasting taxpayers' money.

To further increase the likelihood of risk-adjusted decisions, legal protection for whistleblowers may be an appropriate measure. This approach has many supporters but is still controversial.

Procedures, geared towards regulated controversies, are traditionally found in certain areas of society. They significantly reduce error rates. Civil or criminal court proceedings are examples of this.

The time and money required for more transparent decision-making procedures can be significant. However, sticking with our example, searching for and recovering barrels containing hazardous materials that have sunk in the ocean are the more expensive option for the taxpayer.

Wider perspective

In addition to the issue of radioactive waste disposal, there is also the question of minimising public risk in areas such as microplastic pollution, food safety and public procurement. While the approach may vary from sector to sector, the task of minimising the likelihood of significant long-term harm to citizens and taxpayers remains the same.

Significantly reducing the damage caused by the quest for quick and cheap solutions will take a long time and entail high costs.

Let us go back to the first question: some impacts may be invisible, but if we make the process of dealing with them more transparent, then we increase the visibility of the issue and are better placed to tackle it.